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Introduction
Banks and building societies provide important services to
households and businesses, intermediating saving and
borrowing, providing payment services and distributing risk.
The interest rates at which lenders extend credit are important
for both monetary policy and financial stability.  They will
affect spending and investment decisions and so influence
nominal demand in the economy.  And they will affect the
profitability of lenders and so — if profits are retained —
influence the flow of new capital available to the banking
sector.
In the United Kingdom, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)
is able to influence new lending rates through changes to Bank
Rate.(2) But while Bank Rate was reduced significantly during
the recent financial crisis, new lending rates to households 
fell by a much smaller amount — and in some cases rose 
(Chart 1).
This article explores the factors that may have influenced the
path of new lending rates to households.  The analysis in this
article cannot be repeated for lending to businesses as a
similar set of new lending rates is not available.
A simple framework is adopted to decompose new lending
rates into lenders’ funding costs, credit risk charges and a
residual, which includes both operating costs and the mark-up.
This analytical framework is consistent with the pricing
approach taken by the major UK lenders.(3) In practice,
however, there will be some variation between pricing models,
reflecting lenders’ distinct strategies and balance sheets.  So
this article can only provide an indication of the factors that
may have influenced the price of new lending.(4)
During the recent financial crisis Bank Rate was reduced sharply, but in general the interest rates
charged on new lending to households did not fall by as much and indeed some interest rates rose.
This article assesses the factors that have influenced new lending rates using a simple
decomposition of new lending rates into lenders’ funding costs, credit risk charges and a residual
(which includes both operating costs and the mark-up).  Applying the decomposition to two
indicative lending products suggests that funding costs have been an important driver of new
lending rates and the residual has also risen.  The residual needs to be interpreted with caution — by
definition it reflects all the remaining unmodelled factors.  But among other things, a larger residual
is consistent with lenders increasing mark-ups over marginal costs for new lending, which may
reflect a need to build higher capital levels within the banking sector.
Understanding the price of new lending
to households
By Richard Button of the Bank’s Financial Institutions Division and Silvia Pezzini and Neil Rossiter of the Bank’s
Monetary Assessment and Strategy Division.
(1)
(1) The authors would like to thank James Benford, Claire Halsall and Jens Søndergaard
for their earlier work on this topic and Jonathan Bridges, Rob Edwards and 
Özlem Oomen for their help in producing this article.
(2) Changes in new lending rates will influence inflation principally through domestic
demand.  But changes in Bank Rate also influence inflation via movements in asset
prices, the exchange rate and expectations/confidence affecting domestic demand,
external demand and import prices.
(3) See, for example, British Bankers’ Association (2010), which outlines the broad
principles of the pricing approach for lending to small businesses.
(4) This article has been partly informed by discussions with the major UK lenders about
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Chart 1 New lending rates(a) and Bank Rate
(a) Sterling-only end-month average quoted rates.  The Bank’s quoted interest rate series
comprise data from up to 24 UK monetary financial institutions.
(b) £10,000 personal loan average quoted rate.
(c) 75% loan to value (LTV) tracker mortgage average quoted rate.Research and analysis Understanding the price of new lending to households 173
The article is structured in five sections.  The first section
introduces the framework that is used to decompose the price
of new lending.  The second section applies this framework to
the average price of new lending charged by the banking sector
for both new secured and unsecured lending to households.
The third section then examines how the results differ using
individual lenders’ new lending rates.  The fourth section
considers the relationship between the residual item from the
decomposition of average new lending rates and lenders’ net
interest margins.  The final section sets out the implications
from the results for both monetary policy and financial
stability.
Framework
A simple framework can be used to decompose new lending
rates offered by the major UK lenders(1) into three underlying
factors.  First, there is the funding cost faced by lenders.
Second, there are credit risk charges, for both the cost
associated with the expected loss on the loan and the capital
charge (to account for the cost of holding capital against
unexpected losses).  Third, there is a residual item which
captures a variety of other factors, principally the operating
cost and mark-up.  The remainder of this section reviews each
of these components in turn.
Funding cost
Lenders need to raise funds to extend loans to households.
These funds can come from a variety of sources and at a range
of interest rates.  The sources can be categorised broadly into
customer deposits (from households and businesses) and
wholesale funding (from other lenders and institutional
investors).(2)
In setting the price for new lending, lenders must factor in the
cost of raising an additional unit of funding — the marginal
funding cost.  Lenders report that the marginal funding source
is typically long-term wholesale debt since this is the market in
which it is possible to raise a large amount of funding over a
short period.(3) Lenders would be less able to raise a specified
amount of retail deposits over a short period as households do
not typically respond quickly to changes in interest rates.
Furthermore, long-term wholesale funding will more closely
match the expected number of years that a loan will be
extended, which is typically around five years on average
(although this will differ by product).(4) Going forward, new
liquidity regulation for the banking sector will place
importance on long-term funding for all forms of lending.(5)
In this article the marginal funding cost — the cost of 
long-term variable-rate wholesale funding — is estimated as
the sum of three-month Libor plus the average of the five-year
credit default swap (CDS) premia of the major UK lenders
weighted by their shares in new lending.  The marginal funding
cost is explored in more detail in the box on pages 174–75.
Before the financial crisis, lenders were able to raise new 
long-term wholesale funding at rates quite close to Bank Rate
(Chart 2).  Risk premia were small.  Implicitly, market
participants considered there to be a relatively low risk that
lenders might fail.
From the autumn of 2007 onwards, market participants
became increasingly concerned about the robustness of the
banking sector and demanded higher compensation for the
risk that lenders might fail, so credit risk premia increased.
Consequently, the cost of issuing new long-term debt rose —
both in absolute terms (in the early stages of the financial
crisis) and relative to Bank Rate.
More recently, despite improvements in the capital and
liquidity positions of lenders, the cost of issuing new long-term
debt has remained high relative to Bank Rate.  Market
participants appear to continue to demand significantly
greater compensation than previously for the credit risk
associated with long-term exposures to lenders.(6)
Credit risk
Lenders’ decisions about whether to extend credit to














Chart 2 Marginal funding cost(a) and Bank Rate 
Sources:  Bank of England, Bloomberg, British Bankers’ Association, Markit Group Limited and 
Bank calculations.
(a) This is the estimated marginal funding cost for extending variable-rate sterling-denominated
loans.  It is the sum of three-month Libor plus an average of the five-year CDS premia of the
major UK lenders (Banco Santander, Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, Nationwide,
Northern Rock and Royal Bank of Scotland).  For further information on the marginal funding
cost, see the box on pages 174–75.
(1) For the purposes of this article, the major UK lenders comprise Banco Santander
(including Abbey prior to acquisition), Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group
(including Lloyds TSB and HBOS prior to the merger), Nationwide, Northern Rock and
Royal Bank of Scotland.
(2) Short-term wholesale funding comprises interbank deposits, certificates of deposit
and commercial paper.  Long-term wholesale funding comprises senior unsecured
bonds and senior secured bonds, such as residential mortgage-backed securities and
covered bonds.
(3) Lenders with a greater proportion of retail deposits may consider the cost of
wholesale and retail funding when setting the marginal funding cost.
(4) For example, while mortgages often have a final maturity of around 25 years, in
practice borrowers typically repay the loan early.  This may be to achieve a lower
borrowing rate, to increase the size of the loan or because the borrower is moving
home. 
(5) For example, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009).
(6) For a detailed discussion of recent developments in UK banks’ funding costs, see the
June 2010 Financial Stability Report, pages 46–53 (Bank of England (2010a)).174 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q3
The marginal funding cost:  transfer pricing
The decision by lenders to extend loans or raise deposits is
made by their individual business units, such as the retail
business unit that is responsible for extending credit to and
raising deposits from households.  In principle, business units
could use the deposits that they raise to fund the loans they
extend, but the amount of loans typically exceeds the amount
of deposits leaving a funding requirement (a customer funding
gap) that must be filled with wholesale funding.  In practice,
each lender’s treasury will raise and determine the cost of
marginal funding, intermediating both the cost and the
demand and supply of funding across business units.  The
‘transfer price’ is set by each lender’s treasury.  It typically
represents both the rate at which funds are provided to
business units to make loans and the rate at which the
deposits raised by business units are remunerated.  This box
explores transfer pricing in greater depth.(1)
Taking the transfer price as a starting point, a business unit will
then decide the rate at which to extend loans or raise deposits
(Figure A).  Typically, new lending rates are priced at a spread
above the transfer price, while new deposit rates are priced at
a spread below the transfer price.  Consequently, the transfer
price does not affect the average profitability of the business
unit, ie the interest received on loans minus the interest paid
on deposits (X minus Y in Figure A).  When expressed as a
proportion of loans outstanding, this is the net interest margin
of a business unit.  While the transfer price does not affect the
average profitability of the business unit it will affect both new
lending and deposit rates.
Each lender’s treasury typically sets the transfer price based on 
long-term wholesale funding costs.  This is the market in which
a lender can be most confident that it can raise a significant
amount of funding at short notice.  In contrast, a lender may
not be able to raise a large amount of retail deposits at short
notice.  For example, a large group of individuals may be
slower to decide to increase their deposits than a small group
of institutional investors may be to provide a large amount of
wholesale funding.  It is possible that a lender with a greater
proportion of funding from retail deposits may choose to
consider the costs of both wholesale and retail funding when
setting the transfer price.  It is also possible that not all lenders
may have explicitly set the marginal cost of funding as the cost
of long-term wholesale debt prior to the financial crisis;
instead the customer funding gap may have been filled using
short-term wholesale funding (eg interbank loans).  But this is
unlikely to affect the pricing framework as there was little
difference between long-term and short-term wholesale
funding costs prior to the financial crisis (the cost of both
types of funding was close to three-month Libor).
The funding cost typically used by each lender’s treasury to set
the transfer price is the cost of raising variable-rate long-term
wholesale debt.  This is the cost of raising fixed-rate senior
unsecured bonds and entering into an interest rate swap where
the lender receives a series of fixed-rate cash flows and pays a
series of floating-rate cash flows.  The transfer price has two
components.  First, there is the stream of variable-rate cash
flows paid in the interest rate swap (three-month Libor).  And
second, there is the spread of the fixed-rate bond yield over
the swap rate — this is the asset swap spread (Figure B).
Lenders do not issue new long-term debt on a regular basis, so
the spread is set by each lender’s treasury using a variety of
reference points, including the prevailing asset swap spread of
lenders’ debt trading in secondary markets or lenders’ CDS
premia.  This article uses lenders’ five-year CDS premia which
provide transparent daily data at constant maturity (ie the
maturity of the CDS is always five years).  It would be possible
to use the prevailing asset swap spread of lenders’ debt trading
in secondary markets, but this is not available on a consistent
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Figure A Transfer pricing within a typical lender(a)
(a) A blue arrow indicates the rate at which the business unit is remunerated for lending funds to the treasury and to borrowers.  
A red arrow indicates the rate at which the business unit pays to borrow funds from the treasury or savers.Research and analysis Understanding the price of new lending to households 175
day).  Even if it were possible to compare five-year CDS premia
and five-year asset swap spreads, their levels may still differ
due to the liquidity of secondary bond markets, an issue at
times during the financial crisis.
Figure B sets out the cost of variable-rate funding for variable
rate loans.  But business units may extend credit on a 
fixed-rate basis.  In addition to centrally managing the funding
flows and setting the transfer price, the treasury also centrally
manages interest rate risk.  This ensures the loans extended by
the business unit are all priced on a floating-rate basis.  In
practice, the treasury will swap the fixed-rate cash flows
received from the borrower into floating-rate cash flows
(analogous to the swap used to transform fixed-rate debt into
floating-rate debt).  The cost of this swap is reflected in the
transfer price for fixed-rate lending — so the marginal funding
cost for new fixed-rate lending is typically higher than the
marginal cost for new floating-rate lending.
(1) For information on transfer pricing in a pan-European context, see Section 6 and
Annexes 2 and 3 of European Central Bank (2009).
assessment of the risk that the borrower may not repay the
loan in full.
This credit risk comprises two components.  First, lenders must
account for the cost of the expected loss associated with the
loan.  Second, lenders must account for the cost of holding
capital to meet the possibility that losses might exceed this
central estimate — this is the unexpected loss associated with
the loan.  This capital charge can be calculated on both a
regulatory capital basis (as set out by the Financial Services
Authority (FSA) in line with Basel guidelines) or on an
economic capital basis (as set by the lenders themselves).
The two components of credit risk are calculated by each
lender using proprietary data.  These data are confidential so
this article constructs estimates based on the method set out
in the box on pages 176–77 and on the assumption that 
lenders price new loans on the basis of the regulatory capital
charge.
Loans will attract different credit risk charges depending on the
perceived risk.  For secured lending the loan is backed by
collateral, for example mortgages are secured on residential
property:  the value of this collateral reduces the loss faced by
the lender if the borrower defaults.  In contrast, for unsecured
lending (for example personal loans) the loan is not backed by
collateral and so the lender expects to suffer a more significant
loss if the borrower defaults.  It follows that the expected loss
and capital charge for secured lending are both lower than
those for unsecured lending.
The expected loss component is estimated to have increased
over the past two years (Chart 3).  This reflects an increase in
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Chart 3 Expected loss component of credit risk(a)
Sources:  Bank of England, Council of Mortgage Lenders, UK Cards Association and 
Bank calculations.
(a) For detail on the methodology used to estimate the expected loss see the box on 
pages 176–77.
(b) Expected loss for personal loans (all products).
(c) Expected loss for 75% LTV mortgages (all products).
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Figure B Determining the transfer price:  variable-rate wholesale funding(a)
(a) A blue (red) arrow indicates the cash flows received (paid) by the treasury.176 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q3
Credit risk
Lenders must account for the most likely loss associated with
the loan — this is the expected loss.  And lenders must account
for the cost of the capital they hold to meet the possibility
that losses might exceed this central estimate — this is the
capital charge.  Lenders do not release data on the two
components of credit risk.  For the purposes of this article
estimates for these components are constructed based on the
method set out in this box.
Expected loss
The expected loss can be thought of as the combination of 
the likelihood that a borrower will default, the loss rate
suffered by the lender if default occurs and the balance of the
loan at the time of default.  As a result it varies over time.
Formally, the expected loss (EL) is the product of the
probability of default (PD), the loss given default (LGD) and 
the exposure at default (EAD) expressed as a percentage of the
full loan amount:
ELt = PDt x LGDt x EADt (1)
Lenders generate both the probability of default and the loss
given default for secured and unsecured lending to households
using internal models conditioned on proprietary historical
data of default experience.  However, it is possible to estimate
both the probability of default and the loss given default using
a combination of publicly available data and assumptions.  The
exposure at default is assumed to be the full loan amount as
borrowers may default at any point from the start of the loan.
For the purpose of this article it is set to 100%.
Estimating the probability of default
The probability of default measures how likely it is that
borrowers will default.  A leading indicator of default is
borrowers falling behind on interest payments on the loan
(known as arrears), particularly for those who miss more than
six consecutive interest payments.  Data on arrears rates
(arrears as a proportion of loans) are published for both
secured and unsecured lending to households.
For secured lending to households, the Council of Mortgage
Lenders publishes arrears rates, including the greater than 
six months’ arrears rate.  This can be used to estimate the
probability of default on, for example, a 75% loan to value
(LTV) mortgage.  Historical data on defaults show that the
probability of default will vary with the degree of
collateralisation of the loan.  For example, mortgages with a
lower LTV ratio (ie higher collateralisation) generally enter
default less frequently and so have a lower probability of
default.(1) Data from the Financial Services Authority (FSA) on
default rates suggest the probability of default for 75% LTV
mortgages can be calibrated as 0.7 multiplied by the aggregate
mortgage six-month arrears rate (M-ARREARS>6m).  So the
probability of default for secured lending is given by:
PDsecured,t = 0.7 x M-ARREARS>6m,t (2a)
For unsecured lending to households, there is no published
arrears rate for personal loans.  However, the UK Cards
Association publishes arrears rates for credit cards, including
the greater than six months arrears rate (CC-ARREARS>6m).
Personal loan arrears rates can be estimated from credit card
arrears rates using a simple calibration parameter (ε):  
ε reflects the relationship between the probability of default
for credit cards and the probability of default for personal
loans.  This can be calibrated using a measure of the realised
probability of default — the write-off rate (the level of 
write-offs as a proportion of the stock of lending).  ε is the
ratio of the personal loan write-off rate to the credit card
write-off rate.  So the probability of default for unsecured
lending is given by:
PDunsecured,t =  εt x CC-ARREARS>6m,t (2b)
Estimating the loss given default
For secured lending, lenders will only realise a loss if the
collateral backing the loan is lower than the value of the loan
at the time of default.  The major UK lenders’ Basel II Pillar 3
disclosures on loss given default suggest that realised recovery
rates (across all mortgage types and all LTVs) are around 85%
(based mainly on UK exposures, but including some non-UK
exposures).  This article adopts a conservative assumption of a
65% recovery rate for 75% LTV mortgages.  This lower
recovery rate enables the pricing model to allow for possible
falls in house prices in the order of 20% by the time of the
default.  Recognising that for 75% LTV mortgages the value of
the collateral is greater than the loan, the loss given default for
mortgages can be calculated using the assumed recovery rate:
LGDsecured,t = max {0 ; 1 – ( 1 / LTVt ) x 0.65}    (3)
For unsecured lending, similar Basel II Pillar 3 disclosures on
the loss given default for personal loans (part of ‘other retail
exposures’) suggest that realised recovery rates are around 
30%–40% (again including some non-UK exposures).  To be
conservative, this article assumes the recovery rate on
personal loans is just 10%.
Comparing expected losses to realised losses
Over time, lenders experience defaults on their existing loans
and write off these bad debts.  The write-off rate — the
amount of write-offs expressed as a percentage of the loan
portfolio — is a measure of realised losses on existing lending.
Comparing the estimates of expected losses on new lending
used in this article to the realised losses on existing lending
provides a test of whether the expected losses were (withResearch and analysis Understanding the price of new lending to households 177
hindsight) large enough.  Generally, the estimates used in this
article for expected losses for both secured and unsecured
lending are larger than the realised losses (write-off rates)
experienced by lenders on their secured and unsecured
(excluding credit card) loan portfolios (Charts A and B).
It is possible for the expected loss at a certain point in time to
be lower than the realised loss on existing lending if, for
example, the outlook for the creditworthiness of borrowers is
expected to improve relative to the recent period.  This is most
likely the case in the most recent data for unsecured lending
where the realised loss on existing lending is high (in part due
to the effects on households of the recent recession), but the
expected loss on new lending is slightly lower as the outlook
for households’ financial condition is improving steadily in line
with the gradual recovery in the macroeconomy currently
under way.
Capital charge
The capital charge can be thought of as the cost of accounting
for the unexpected loss associated with extending a new loan.
This article assumes the capital charge is set on a regulatory
capital (rather than economic capital) basis.  This can be
calculated using the Basel I/II formula where the capital charge
is the product of the 8% minimum capital requirement (MCR),
the risk weight (RW) and the cost of capital (RC, assumed to be
10% for all lenders):(2)
CC = MCR x RW x RC (4)
The standardised approach in Basel II sets the risk weights for
lending at 35% for mortgages with LTV lower than 80%
(otherwise 50% for higher LTVs) and at 100% for all types of
unsecured loan.(3) Lenders with advanced credit risk modelling
techniques may be authorised by the FSA to set risk weights
based on their default experience (the internal ratings-based
approach).  Without these risk weights, this article assumes
that lenders use the risk weights set out under the
standardised approach (in the case of 75% LTV mortgages,
50% until the end of 2006 and 35% from 2007 onwards) to
estimate the capital charge that covers for unexpected
losses.(4)
As a result, the estimated capital charges for 75% LTV
mortgages are 40 basis points until the end of 2006 and 
28 basis points from 2007 onward, and 80 basis points for
personal loans.  From 2007, lenders using the internal 
ratings-based approach under Basel II have some flexibility in
setting lower risk weights depending on their experience, so
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Chart A Secured lending to households:  expected loss
on new 75% LTV mortgages and realised loss on existing
mortgages
Sources:  Bank of England, Council of Mortgage Lenders and Bank calculations.
(a) Expected loss for 75% LTV mortgages (all products).
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Chart B Unsecured lending to households:  expected loss
on new personal loans and realised loss on existing
unsecured lending(a)
Sources:  Bank of England, UK Cards Association and Bank calculations.
(a) Excluding existing credit card loans.
(b) Expected loss for personal loans (all products).
(c) UK-resident lenders’ write-off rate on all sterling non credit card unsecured lending to
households.
(1) While LTV is not a measure of affordability, a lower LTV at origination means a larger
deposit was used upon purchase, alongside the mortgage.  This should increase the
willingness of a borrower to continue to meet interest payments to avoid losing the
deposit and may indicate increased ability of a borrower to meet interest payments
(higher deposit may be a sign of higher income).  See Table 4.5 on page 40 of Financial
Services Authority (2009).
(2) Academic studies place the cost of capital for banks at slightly below 10%.  See 
page 60 of the June 2010 Financial Stability Report.  Assuming a higher cost of capital
would not have a material impact on the residual, for example 15% would only
increase the capital charge for 75% LTV mortgages to 60 basis points until the end of
2006 and 42 basis points from 2007 onward.  The charge for personal loans would
increase to 120 basis points.
(3) See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006).  Prior to 2007, under Basel I, risk
weights were 50% for all mortgages, 100% for unsecured.  Not all major UK lenders
may have transitioned to Basel II capital requirements from January 2007.
(4) The experience of the financial crisis may suggest that some Basel II risk weights were
not appropriate for the level of risk borne by the lender.  This and other issues are
currently under debate between central banks and regulators, and the lenders
themselves.178 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q3
than six months, which has been in part influenced by the
recession and associated rise in unemployment.  
While the expected loss changes over time, the regulatory
capital charge is assumed to have been unchanged in recent
years, following the introduction of Basel II.  For secured loans
(75% LTV mortgages) the capital charge is 28 basis points,
while for higher risk unsecured lending (personal loans) the
capital charge is 80 basis points.  Further detail on the
calculation of the regulatory capital charge component can be
found in the box on pages 176–77.
Other factors
In addition to funding costs and credit risk charges, a variety of
other factors will also influence lenders’ pricing models.  These
are captured in the residual in this decomposition.
Two principal factors that will be captured within the 
residual are the operating costs incurred by a lender through
the life of a loan and the mark-up.  Taking them in turn, lenders
incur operating costs on all the activities that support the
origination and servicing of a loan, such as maintaining a
branch network and paying staff wages.(1) It is likely that
operating costs have been little changed recently, though
lenders may have actively sought to reduce operating costs in
order to restore profitability following the financial crisis.  The
other main factor included in the residual is the mark-up that
lenders charge over their marginal costs, which ensures that
each loan extended generates an expected rate of return. 
In addition, new lending rates may also be affected by other
factors.  For example, fees attached to products (such as
application fees) and revenue streams from activities related to
lending (such as insurance premiums) would increase the
overall return on new lending.  This may decrease the price of
new lending.  A fall in competition within the banking sector
would tend to increase the price of new lending, holding other
factors constant.  Prospective tightening of capital and
liquidity regulation may raise expectations of future costs
associated with loans currently being extended and so increase
the price of new lending.(2)
Decomposing the price of new lending
Having set out the analytical framework, this section outlines
the quantitative decomposition of new lending rates for both
secured and unsecured lending to households.  As discussed
earlier, given the variation in pricing models between lenders,
there is, inevitably, considerable uncertainty attached to the
size of each component.  The relative sizes of the components
and their trends over time are more informative than the
absolute size of any component at any point in time.  By
construction, the magnitude of the residual is highly sensitive
to the assumptions on the costs associated with funding and
credit risk and so should be considered an indicative estimate.
The analysis of new lending rates is based on the average
quoted new lending rates.(3) In practice, lenders offer a menu
of new rates for secured and unsecured lending.  The Bank
collates these quoted new lending rates by product and
publishes average quoted rates.(4) The next subsections will
decompose the price of two common loan products.
Secured lending
Lenders offer a range of secured lending products.  They
include variable-rate mortgages (for example tracker and
discounted variable-rate mortgages) and fixed-rate mortgages
(products with initial fix periods, for example two-year and
five-year, which later revert to the standard variable rate, the
SVR).  These are offered across a range of LTV ratios.
Decomposing a typical rate for secured lending — such as a
75% LTV tracker mortgage(5) — shows that the two main
factors associated with changes in pricing are the funding cost
and the residual.  The expected loss and capital charge are
relatively small in absolute terms, though the proportionate
increase in the expected loss component since the financial
crisis has been large (Chart 4).
The evolution of new secured lending rates can be divided into
three broad periods.  Before the onset of the financial crisis,
new mortgages were priced broadly in line with estimated
(1) These costs will vary with lenders’ business models.  For example, processing loan
applications through a branch network is typically more costly than through a call
centre or over the internet.
(2) On 12 September 2010, the governing body of the Basel Committee announced
higher global minimum capital standards.  See Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (2010).
(3) In practice, households may borrow at rates higher or lower than quoted rates, which
are only a guide to pricing.
(4) For more information, see ‘Explanatory notes — quoted household interest rates’
(Bank of England (2010b)).
(5) The rate on a Bank Rate tracker mortgage is set at a fixed spread to Bank Rate for the
life of the mortgage (typically 25 years).  The rate on the mortgage changes only if

















Chart 4 Decomposition of new secured lending rate(a)
Sources:  Bank of England, Bloomberg, British Bankers’ Association, Council of Mortgage Lenders, 
Markit Group Limited and Bank calculations.
(a) 75% LTV tracker mortgage average quoted rate.  See Chart 1, footnote (a) for information on
average quoted rates.Research and analysis Understanding the price of new lending to households 179
marginal funding costs and the residual was very small.  During
the financial crisis, funding costs rose sharply and the residual
became negative.  It is possible lenders were surprised by the
persistence of higher funding costs and so may have been slow
to update the pricing of new mortgages.  Since early 2009 the
residual has increased markedly.
The rise in the residual may have reflected an increase in the
mark-up charged on new lending.  Operating costs are unlikely
to have changed significantly during the financial crisis.  And
the product fees associated with mortgages are unlikely to
have changed materially.
Another potential explanation for the rise in the residual could
be that lenders incorporated higher credit risk charges into the
price of new secured lending than the already conservative
estimates included in this article.  For the expected loss,
lenders may expect a greater deterioration in households’
creditworthiness to increase the probability of default.  For the
most recent period, trebling the expected loss (for example by
using an arrears rate at a level similar to the peak observed in
the early 1990s recession) would explain a quarter of the
current residual.  For the capital charge, lenders may have
expected a greater cost of capital over the life of the loan
following the financial crisis.  For the most recent period
doubling the capital charge would explain a third of the current
residual.
Alternatively, the lenders may update the price of new lending
more slowly than the pace at which lenders’ funding costs
change (for example because of ‘menu costs’ in updating
quoted new lending rates too frequently).  If this were true, the
price of new lending could be expected to fall significantly in
the near term.  The implications of the recent increase in the
residual will be considered in the final section of this article.
Unsecured lending
Lenders offer a range of unsecured lending products, including
personal loans (typically £5,000 or £10,000, available over a
range of maturities), credit cards and overdrafts.
Decomposing a typical rate for unsecured lending — such as a
£10,000 fixed-rate personal loan — shows that, as with
secured lending, changes in both the funding cost and the
residual item are important determinants of pricing (Chart 5).
But, unlike secured lending, the expected loss is large given the
lack of collateral.  The capital charge is again relatively small,
though larger than for secured lending.
The evolution of unsecured lending rates can also be divided
into a number of distinct periods.  Between 2004 and 2006,
unsecured loan rates were on average somewhat below
marginal costs.  But the sale of single premium payment
protection insurance (PPI) alongside personal loans ensured
that the overall mark-up on the loan was likely to have been
positive at the time.(1) From 2006, the level of personal
insolvencies increased, but lenders tightened criteria for new
unsecured lending to reduce likely losses on new lending rather
than raise the price.  From 2008 investigations by the FSA into
the pricing and cross-selling of PPI, started in 2005, gathered
pace, and lenders were formally prevented from cross-selling
PPI with personal loans in early 2009.  In light of the loss of
income from PPI, lenders started to rebuild the mark-up on
unsecured lending.
The funding cost used in the decomposition follows the same
pattern as that for secured lending.  It currently accounts for a
smaller proportion of the overall cost of new unsecured
lending than it did before the crisis.
The expected loss component is higher than that for secured
lending, principally reflecting the potential for greater losses
should the borrower default.  This article assumes that the
recovery rate on this type of lending is small at 10% of the
loan amount.
As with secured lending, it is possible that the residual reflects
an increase in the mark-up on new lending (partly in response
to the loss of PPI-related income) or could again reflect higher
credit risk charges, over and above the conservative estimates
included in this article.
(1) PPI is an insurance product offered to households by lenders and other intermediaries.
The policy typically aims to meet monthly loan repayments for up to twelve months if
the borrower is out of work.  Households can choose to pay regular monthly
premiums (regular payment PPI) or pay a one-off premium (single payment PPI),
which is often added to the balance of the personal loan (and so accrues interest at
the same rate as the loan).  A report on PPI by the Office of Fair Trading found that the
premium for single payment PPI was equivalent to doubling the interest rate on the
personal loan and that around half of the premium was retained by lenders (Office of





















Chart 5 Decomposition of new unsecured lending rate(a)
Sources:  Bank of England, Bloomberg, British Bankers’ Association, Markit Group Limited, 
UK Cards Association and Bank calculations.
(a) £10,000 personal loan average quoted rate.  See Chart 1, footnote (a) for information on
average quoted rates.
(b) The loan is fixed rate, so the funding cost incorporates the cost of entering into an interest
rate swap.  For further information on the marginal funding cost, see the box on 
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Differences in lenders’ rates and costs
The results have so far been couched in terms of aggregate
data.  While this article assumes that the major UK lenders
face the same marginal costs for expected loss and the capital
charge, lenders offer distinct new lending rates and face
different costs when extending loans, leading to a range of
decompositions and associated residuals across the banking
sector.  Individual institution data are confidential and cannot
be published.  But this section aims to give a feel for the range
of pricing decompositions across the major UK lenders using
the price of new secured lending as an example.  The
distributions discussed in this section do not account for the
uncertainty over the absolute size of any component.
The range of lenders’ new secured lending rates has widened
somewhat following the reduction in Bank Rate (Chart 6).
This may reflect differences in funding costs faced by lenders.
But it may also reflect differences in lenders’ pricing models.
The median new lending rate in Chart 6 is not the same as the
average new lending rate in Chart 4 (which is a weighted
average of the individual lenders’ rates based on the market
share of new lending).
The differences in the long-term wholesale funding cost
between lenders became particularly marked during the
financial crisis (Chart 7).  Funding costs were broadly similar
across lenders up to mid-2007.  During the second half of
2007, funding costs began to diverge sharply as market
participants reappraised the credit risk faced by each lender.
And the distribution across the banking sector remains wider
than before the financial crisis.
Having been negative during the early stages of the financial
crisis, the residual component of new lending rates rose in
2009, as in the analysis using average new lending rates
(Chart 8).  A reasonably wide dispersion remains, reflecting
differences in pricing models between lenders and continued
differentiation between borrowers in funding markets.  This
dispersion will also reflect other factors such as the use of
product fees and cross-selling by different lenders, the
competitive environment and the operational capacity of
lenders’ back offices to process loan applications.  The relative
importance of these factors is likely to have varied across

















Chart 7 Distribution of marginal funding costs(a)(b)
Sources:  Bloomberg, British Bankers’ Association, Markit Group Limited and Bank calculations.
(a) Long-term variable-rate wholesale funding cost proxied by three-month Libor plus five-year
CDS premia (for each individual lender).  See Chart 2, footnote (a) for information on the
marginal funding cost.















Chart 8 Distribution of residual component of pricing for
new secured lending to households(a)(b)(c)
Sources:  Bank of England, Bloomberg, British Bankers’ Association, Council of Mortgage Lenders, 
Markit Group Limited and Bank calculations.
(a) 75% LTV tracker mortgage average quoted rate.  See Chart 1, footnote (a) for information on
average quoted rates.
(b) The sample is aligned with Chart 6.
















Chart 6 Distribution of new secured lending rates(a)(b)
Sources:  Bank of England and Bank calculations.
(a) 75% LTV tracker mortgage average quoted rate.  See Chart 1, footnote (a) for information on
average quoted rates.
(b) Not all the major UK lenders quote rates in all periods, so the sample varies over time.Research and analysis Understanding the price of new lending to households 181
The residual and net interest margin
The residual item appears to have been an important part of
the price at which lenders extended some types of credit to
households and is substantially higher now than before the
financial crisis.  The increase in the residual may reflect a rise in
the mark-up over marginal costs as operating costs are
expected to have been little changed and may even have fallen
recently.  This section explores the possible reasons for that
increase.
The rise in the residual — to the extent it reflects an increase in
the mark-up over marginal costs — is consistent with a desire
by lenders to improve the net interest margin on the existing
loan portfolio.  The net interest margin is the difference
between the interest that a lender receives on all loans and the
interest it pays on all funding instruments as a proportion of
loans outstanding.  Since the start of the financial crisis,
lenders’ net interest margins have come under pressure and
their response may have been to raise the mark-up on new
lending.
One source of pressure on net interest margins has been the
rise in the cost of funding the existing loan portfolio, both from
customer deposits and wholesale funds.  The cost of different
funding instruments has risen relative to Bank Rate following
the onset of the financial crisis (Chart 9).  While variations in
the cost of customer deposits do not affect the price of new
lending (as the marginal cost is set as the price of long-term
wholesale funding), they will affect the net interest margin on
lending.  For a discussion on the interaction between the price
of new lending and the net interest margin, see the box on
pages 174–75.
Before the financial crisis lenders typically offered rates on new
household deposits below Bank Rate.  As Bank Rate was
reduced sharply during the financial crisis, lenders
commensurately reduced deposit rates.  But as deposit rates
cannot fall below zero, the spread between the deposit rates
and Bank Rate also fell sharply.  This is known as the
‘endowment effect’ and has been one source of pressure on
lenders’ net interest margins.  In addition, as lenders seek to
reduce their reliance on wholesale funding, competition for
long-term retail deposits has increased, putting upward
pressure on absolute rates and spreads to Bank Rate.
Net interest margins have also been squeezed by contractual
obligations that lenders face on their existing stock of loans.
For example, lenders may be obliged to pass on changes in
Bank Rate to some variable-rate mortgage products (such as
trackers and those linked to lenders’ standard variable rate, the
SVR).  Before the financial crisis, the rate on new lending was
lower than the rate on existing loans, reflecting competitive
pressures in the market which reduced new lending rates.  But
during the financial crisis that situation has reversed as the
‘back-book effect’ has led to a sharp fall in the average interest
rate charged on existing secured loans, such that the rate is
now lower than that on new lending (Chart 10).
The combination of the endowment effect (raising the cost of
deposits) and the back-book effect (lowering the return on
existing assets) has contributed to a sharp fall in net interest
margins on the overall stock of loans to households since the
onset of the financial crisis.  Lenders are seeking to rebuild net
interest margins — some have stated long-term targets — in
part through a higher mark-up on new lending.  This is
consistent with lenders rebuilding capital through retained
earnings, an important part of the ongoing adjustment process
for the UK banking sector and a factor that should ultimately
















  wholesale funding(a)
Chart 9 Cost of different funding instruments
Sources:  Bank of England, Bloomberg, British Bankers’ Association, Markit Group Limited and
Bank calculations.
(a) The long-term wholesale funding cost is proxied by the sum of three-month Libor plus an
average of the five-year CDS premia for the major lenders.
(b) The sight deposit and one-year retail bond rates are weighted averages of rates from banks
and building societies.
(c) The one-year retail bond rate is the cost of a floating-rate one-year retail deposit, ie the cost
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Chart 10 Divergence in lending rates to households(a)
(a) For information on effective rates see Bank of England (2010c).
(b) The actual (effective not quoted) rate on variable-rate secured lending prevailing on all loans
on lenders’ balance sheets.
(c) The actual (effective not quoted) rate on variable-rate secured lending prevailing on new
lending each month.182 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q3
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Implications for monetary policy and financial
stability
The decoupling of new lending rates from Bank Rate since the
onset of the financial crisis appears to have been
predominantly driven by two factors.  First, long-term
wholesale funding costs (relative to Bank Rate) increased
sharply.  And, second, the residual component also picked up.  
Higher long-term wholesale funding costs reflect a reappraisal
among market participants about the perceived riskiness of
lenders.  Prior to the financial crisis, risk premia on all types of
assets were low — including on lenders’ long-term debt.  But
the events of the financial crisis led investors to require greater
compensation for exposure to the credit risk of lenders, and
funding costs in wholesale markets increased sharply.  That
contributed to a rise in new lending rates relative to Bank Rate.
The increase in the residual is likely to reflect a number of
factors, including the mark-up on new lending.  An increase in
the mark-up is consistent with a desire by lenders to improve
the net interest margin given the low return on the stock of
existing loans (the back-book effect) and the higher cost of
retail deposits (the endowment effect).  It may also have been
influenced by a reduction in the degree of competition within
the banking sector following consolidation.
Movements in the residual can have different implications for
monetary policy and financial stability.  Holding other factors
constant, an increase in the residual would push up on the cost
to households of new borrowing, acting to dampen demand.
But if an increase in the residual reflected higher mark-ups on
new lending, it could increase lenders’ profitability and — if
those profits were retained — enable lenders to increase
capital.
Higher levels of capital in the banking sector are desirable to
enhance financial stability, so long as the process of building
capital levels does not unduly constrain the supply of credit to
households and businesses.  Building up higher levels of capital
in the banking sector reduces the likelihood that lenders will
default and reduces the losses to creditors if lenders do
default.  This should lower market participants’ perceived
riskiness of the lenders and correspondingly lenders’ marginal
funding costs, thus enabling them to reduce the price of new
lending to households while preserving mark-ups.